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1 Introduction
The effects of peer groups and social interactions play a vital role in various policy debates. Re-
searchers examine the effects of peer group and neighborhood characteristics on the likelihood
of teen pregnancy and high-school completion (Evans et al. [19]), teenagers’ criminal behavior
(Glaeser et al. [22], Ludwig et al. [43]), children’s academic achievement and educational out-
comes (Aaronson [1], Hoxby [32], Hanushek et al. [30], Angrist and Lang [2]), college students’
grade, choice of major (Sacerdote [57], Zimmerman [65]) and occupational choice (Marmaros
and Sacerdote [47]), and students’ drug/alcohol use (Gaviria and Raphael [21], Kremer and
Levy [38]).
Among various dimensions of peer interactions, the effect of classroom/school peers on a
student’s own academic performance is at the heart of the diverse debates on educational reform.
For example, a certain structure of peer interactions among classmates, schoolmates and friends
in the residential neighborhood is either implicitly or explicitly assumed in arguments on ability
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grouping (Argys et al. [4], Betts and Shkolnik [6], Figlio and Page [20], Kang et al. [36]), school
desegregation (Angrist and Lang [2], Guryan [27]), school choice (Epple and Romano [18], Cullen
et al. [15]) and school competition (Hoxby [33, 34], Epple et al. [17]). Nonetheless, the existence
and nature of academic interactions among students remain controversial. While some studies
find no significant (or small) peer effects (Hanushek [28], Angrist and Lang [2], Lefgren [42],
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [58] and Arcidiacono and Nicholson [3]), other studies report
significantly positive effects of peer quality on academic achievement (Hoxby [32], Zimmer and
Toma [64], Boozer and Cacciola [8], Sacerdote [57], Hanushek et al. [30], Zimmerman [65],
Winston and Zimmerman [63]).
Such lack of consensus on peer influence reflects various empirical challenges confronted by
studies on peer effects.1 In the face of difficulties in consistent estimation, random assignment
of peers has considerable appeals. Recently, Sacerdote [57], Zimmerman [65], and Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner [58] used random (or quasi-random) variation of peers in college dormitories to
explore the relationship between peers’ and own academic achievement. There are, however, few
studies that exploit similar random assignment of peers at pre-collegiate levels. Conventional
wisdom states that the influence of peers is more important to elementary and secondary school
students. Although various studies have examined the effects on non-academic outcomes such
as teen childbearing, alcohol use, smoking and crimes for students before college, studies that
exploit random assignment of peers in an examination of these issues are rare—let alone those
that focus on academic interactions among students.2
In this study we exploit unique quasi-randomization that takes place in the allocation system
of middle school students (Grades 7 to 9) in South Korea—specifically during the mid-1990s.
Using such random assignment of peers, we examine the existence and structure of academic
1Such challenges include the following: First, a selection problem plagues the empirical analysis. Students
with similar personal and family backgrounds form a peer group and self-select into such a group. As a result,
total correlation of academic outcomes across classrooms or schools may not be attributed to the effect of peers.
Second, a co-movement in the outcomes of a student and her classmates or schoolmates may take place because
both are subject to a common institutional environment. For example, a budget cut at a school may exert
negative effects uniformly on all students, while noise from a nearby construction site affects all students in the
school. Third, errors are likely to be associated with measuring the true peer group of a student. Which group—
classroom or school grade—forms the true peers of the student is often ambiguous in the empirical context. Such
errors may produce peer effects that are empirically negligible due to the attenuation bias. Fourth, in a learning
context, a student’s behavior affects the behavior of her classmates and is reciprocally affected by them as well.
Thus, a student’s outcome is simultaneously determined with the outcomes of peers (the reflection problem a` la
Manski [44]).
2Among others, Boozer and Cacciola [8] exploit random assignment of peers in a US experimental study of
class-size reduction (Project STAR) to examine academic peer effects among kindergarten and elementary school
students. Hanushek [29], however, questions the true randomness of this experiment.
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interactions among students within classroom. The South Korean system of student placement
to middle schools and the classrooms during the mid-1990s is particularly interesting. From
1969, when the “leveling policy” was first introduced in secondary education in South Korea,
the law requires that elementary school graduates be randomly (by lottery) assigned to middle
schools—either public or private—in the relevant residence-based school district. In addition,
the grouping of students by ability and achievement levels within school is extremely rare due to
parental objections and the government’s traditional leveling policy of secondary education. As
a result, the quality of the student body of each school is fairly similar within a school district,
while there exist variations in it across school districts; the non-grouping (or ability mixing)
in school exposes students to a classroom peer group that is nearly exogenously and randomly
determined.3
Using this randomization in student placement, we present that mean achievement of class-
room peers is positively correlated with a student’s performance (standardized mathematics
test score). Using instrumental variables (IV) methods, we also show that the relationship is
causal: the improvement in peer quality enhances a student’s performance. In addition, quantile
regressions reveal that weak students interact more closely with other weak students than with
strong students; hence their learning would be more greatly affected and delayed by the presence
of worst-performing peers. In contrast, strong students are found to interact more closely with
other strong students; hence their learning can be improved by the presence of best-performing
peers. We also examine the implications of these findings for two class formation methods:
ability mixing and grouping.
In addition to our empirical findings, we argue that the conventional interpretation about
peer effects may mislead a class formation policy (ability mixing and grouping) based on peer
interactions. We show below that the conventional interpretation based on a ceteris-paribus
experiment fails to be informative to the debate on ability grouping, since it draws a variation
in outcome when either average or dispersion of peer quality alone changes partially, keeping
the other constant. If a student is relocated across ability mixed and ability grouped classes, she
experiences simultaneous changes in both average and dispersion of peer quality. We suggest
that a more relevant experiment to the class formation policy is how one divide a given pool
3Another merit of the South Korean situation is that classrooms are homogeneous in terms of race and
ethnicity. In contrast, there may be confounding factors in US studies in which different ability combinations of
students often accompany different racial combinations.
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of students into classes of different formats, allowing simultaneous changes in both average and
dispersion of peer quality. In addition, we argue that, rather than directly supporting ability
mixing or grouping, the coefficient of the dispersion of peer quality reveals the relative strength
of the influence of weak and strong students on the individual student. The positive coefficient
implies a benefit of ability grouping to a strong student; the negative coefficient that of ability
mixing to a weak student. Our interpretation of the empirical results gives rise to the policy
implication that is directly opposite the conventional one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in Section
2. Section 3 discusses the institutional background. We specify the empirical model in Section
4, and describe the data in Section 5. Section 6 presents the estimation results and their
implications for ability mixing and grouping in education. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Academic Interactions among Students and Ability Grouping
in Education
2.1 Existing Literature on Peer Interactions
Studies concerning the effects of peers on a student’s academic achievement have been relatively
small, but they recently receive growing attention. For example, interest in social interactions
in various arenas is increasing (Brock and Durlauf [9], Moffitt [51]); the class/school formation
policy (classroom tracking/ability-grouping/streaming versus untracking/ability-mixing) is fre-
quently debated in the context of educational reform (Argys et al. [4], Betts and Shkolnik [6],
Figlio and Page [20]). Early as well as recent studies, however, report mixed results about the
presence and magnitude of the effects of peer groups on the individual student.
Hanushek [28] shows there exists little effect of peer group quality on a student’s academic
outcome. In contrast, Summers and Wolfe [60] and Henderson et al. [31] report significant im-
pacts of average peer quality on a student’s achievement. These studies, however, are usually
vulnerable to various sources of bias (Moffitt [51]). To overcome limitations arising from en-
dogenous peer-group formation, recent studies exploit either randomized (or semi-randomized)
assignment of peers to individual students, or extremely comprehensive data sets that contain
rich information on one’s educational background (e.g., the characteristics of school, teacher,
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peer groups and family, a history of one’s growth in test scores, etc).
Based on random assignment of roommates in college dormitories, Sacerdote [57] and Zim-
merman [65] show a significantly positive association between roommates’ quality and a stu-
dent’s own outcome. In contrast, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [58] report only limited ev-
idence of the positive association. And, in their study that exploits random assignment of
class-level peers arising from Project STAR, Boozer and Cacciola [8] report significantly posi-
tive peer influence on elementary school students in Tennessee.
Instead of random assignment of students, several studies employ rich information of data
sets to explore the effects of peers. Employing a unique data set on Texas elementary school
students, Hanushek et al. [30] find a strong influence of the academic quality of peers (measured
by previous academic performance) on a student’s own outcome. Hoxby [32] also relies on an
exogenous variation of peer groups in Texas elementary schools and finds significant positive
effects of peers’ achievement. Based on data from San Diego Unified School District, Betts
and Zau [7] show positive and significant effects of peers on own achievement growth, while
Vigdor and Nechyba [62] report mixed results (either positive or non-existing peer influence)
on the basis of North Carolina public schools. Employing an international data base from the
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Zimmer and
Toma [64] present significantly positive effects of the quality of peers on a student’s own math
test score. On the contrary, examining students attending 124 US medical schools, Arcidiacono
and Nicholson [3] find no significant association between own and peers’ achievements, once the
school fixed effects are controlled for in the estimation.
2.2 Connection with Ability Grouping in Education
The existence of peer effects in education illustrates the presence of social interactions.4 When
there is a social interaction, positive (negative) externality that arises from it expands (shrinks)
the overall social effect beyond (below) individual marginal effects. Social interactions in edu-
cation have great policy implications for designing the education system of a nation and class
4Academic interactions among school/classroom peers may take place through several channels. High-
achieving peers can instruct the classmates and help their learning. Low-achieving peers may interrupt learning
of others by disruptive behavior. And, good (or bad) performance and behavior of peers can influence a student’s
preference in such a way that she desires to resemble the group taking a particular action. For example, strong
(weak) peers may set a standard a student expects to achieve (avoid). For a broad discussion of various forms of
peer effects and social interactions, see Manski [45] and Glaeser and Scheinkman [23].
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organization within a school. For example, in the US as in many other countries, whether to
track or detrack classrooms in primary and secondary public school is at the heart of recent
debates over educational reform (Argys et al. [4], Betts and Shkolnik [6], Figlio and Page [20]).5
Here, the structure of peer interactions often serves as a guiding light of the debate.6
In the empirical analysis of peer effects, researchers often regress a student’s own achieve-
ment against the (leave-out) mean outcome of classroom/school-grade peers to explore the
relationship between average peer quality and own achievement. In order to examine the ef-
fect of heterogeneity of peer quality, they also control for the variance (or standard deviation)
of peers’ outcomes in addition to average peer quality. Given the estimates, studies interpret
that a non-linear concave-form association between average quality of one’s peers and own
outcome—student performance rising with average quality of peers at a decreasing rate—is
evidence supporting ability mixing in education, while a convex-form association implies the
superiority of ability grouping.7 As for the parameter of the variance in peer quality, studies
suggest that a positive coefficient implies mixing over grouping, while a negative coefficient
grouping over mixing. Zero coefficient means the zero-sum nature of regrouping students.8
Unlike such conventional interpretations, we argue that the shape of partial association
between own achievement, on the one hand, and the average and dispersion of peer quality, on
5Another interesting example of a unique large-scale education reform implemented on a nationwide scale
would be the “leveling policy” of secondary education in South Korea, which started from 1969. Under the
leveling regime, middle schools and general (non-vocational) high schools—both private and public—which had
been strongly stratified by students’ ability in the pre-leveling period, are assigned students with varying abilities
within a school district. With minor revisions since the inception, South Korea presently maintains the traditional
leveling policy in placing students to middle and high schools. The implicit assumption of this reform is that
mixing students of varying ability levels within school and classroom would generate a net gain at the national
level. For details of the reform and its evaluation for high school, see Chung [14] and Kang et al. [36].
6Benabou [5] shows that the efficient and outcome-maximizing method of class formation depends upon the
degree of complementarity of a student’s own ability and that of his/her peers. Lazear [41] shows that the
total size of educational outcome is maximized under student grouping by the likelihood of behaving (an ability
measure), when there exists no peer influence on his/her behavior. If a behaving student encourages non-behaving
students into behaving and the non-behaving students do not interrupt the learning of the behaving students in
a classroom, he points out, the mixed classroom is preferred. Epple and Romano [18] call for empirical evidence
of the extent of complementarity of peer ability and own ability in educational production in order to measure
the total effect of competition between private and public schools.
7Henderson et al. [31], Summers and Wolfe [60], Zimmer and Toma [64] and Zimmerman [65] find concavity in
peer effects. Although he does not use an academic outcome as peer characteristics, Glewwe [24] finds a convex
relationship and suggests tracking may be a better method. In contrast, Hoxby [32] does not find non-linear peer
effects.
8Zimmer and Toma [64] and Vigdor and Nechyba [62] show a positive association between dispersion in peer
quality and own average achievement. They interpret that the finding supports ability mixing in education.
Hanushek et al. [30] find insignificant effects of dispersion in peer quality on average achievement growth and
infer that a regrouping of students will have little impact on overall average. In addition to interpretation issues,
there may be a concern for consistent estimation for the parameter of heterogeneity of peer quality. When a study
uses data from a grouping-based education system, the estimate may be subject to a bias due to endogenous
decisions (by parents and schools) to place a student to mixed or grouped classrooms (Hanushek et al. [30, p.541]).
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the other, has little direct relevance to the overall effectiveness of ability mixing and grouping.
Conventional interpretations attempt to measure the effectiveness of a class format by drawing
a ceteris-paribus change in outcome when a student is relocated from one peer group to another
that is partially different. For instance, a positive (negative) coefficient on the variance of peer
quality is often interpreted as supporting ability mixing (grouping), since a student’s movement
from a peer group with low heterogeneity—grouping—to another with high heterogeneity—
mixing—leads to an increase (decrease) in outcome. However, it is necessary to note that
a change in class formats between ability mixing and grouping accompanies that in average
value of peer quality as well as its variance. Therefore, an evaluation of ability mixing versus
grouping requires simultaneous consideration of many features of peer quality distribution—not
only average peer quality and its dispersion, but the fractions of weak and strong peers in the
classroom (see Figure 1).
In addition, we argue that, rather than directly supporting ability mixing or grouping, the
coefficient of heterogeneity of peer quality reveals the relative strength of the influence of weak
and strong students on the individual student—complementarity and substitutability according
to Benabou [5]. Holding its average fixed, rising (falling) heterogeneity in peer quality means
that the student has an increasing (decreasing) degree of contact with both worst-performing and
best-performing peers, provided that the distribution of peer quality spreads symmetrically. If
the student interacts more closely with best-performing peers than with worst-performing peers,
the coefficient will be positive. If a student is more affected by worst-performing peers than by
best-performing peers, it will be negative. This line of interpretation leads to policy implications
that are the exact opposite of those made by the conventional interpretations. We discuss the
interpretation issues in greater detail in section 6.2.
3 Institutional Background
As briefly discussed in the Introduction, since 1969, the year when the leveling policy was first
introduced to secondary education, the South Korean system of student allocation to middle
schools has been fairly simple and straightforward. A pool of elementary school graduates,
who have to attend middle school under the nine-year compulsory education law, are randomly
by lottery assigned to either a private or public middle school within a residence-based school
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district.9 (As private middle schools are heavily subsidized by the government, they are little
different from public schools in administration and curriculum in South Korea.) Ordinary
middle schools are not allowed to select incoming students, but only entrusted to educate those
assigned to them.10 A regular school district is usually the size of a municipality; there exist a
total of 179 middle school districts in the nation.11 Once assigned, students are not permitted
to change schools within the same district. Those transferring across different school districts
due to residential relocations are also required to be randomly assigned to a new school in the
new district.
In addition to such a district-level placement of students, within-school grouping according to
student ability has been largely avoided by both private and public schools due to parents’ strong
resistance and the long tradition of the government’s egalitarian leveling policy in secondary
education. In middle schools, students are placed to classes in the manner of ability mixing at
the beginning of the academic year (March 1st). Ability mixing in each classroom are usually
attained by organizing each class in a grade in balance of students’ achievement of the previous
year or through randomization.12 Once placed, students stay in the classroom throughout the
year so that the entire class experiences the same nationally-recommended curriculum over the
year. This procedure of student placement causes each class of the same grade to have an almost
identical class size and a fairly similar average academic quality of students at the beginning of
the year.
As for teacher appointment, a homeroom teacher is placed to each class so as to perform
administrative and disciplinary duties, while individual subject teachers visit the classroom to
instruct in respective fields. In the following year, students in a grade are reshuﬄed (again
9For the lottery system and an overview of secondary education in South Korea, see Marlow-Ferguson and
Lopez [46, South Korea] and OECD [53, Chapters 1 and 2].
10Physical education middle schools—unique middle schools for special education—are able to give selective
admissions to students. There existed only four such middle schools in Korea that admitted a total of 202 students
in 1995. (Since the period of interest in this study is the mid-1990’s, statistics are reported for 1995.) Students
with special needs are educated in separate classes in ordinary middle schools. These special classes account for
only a small part of middle school education. In the entire nation, there were 671 such classes in a total of 51,523
middle-school classes in 1995 (Yearbook of Educational Statistics 1995, National Statistical Office).
11For example, the Seoul metropolitan region, in which there were a total of 352 (boys-only, girls-only and co-
ed) middle schools and 180,698 incoming students in 1995, has eleven school districts for middle school allocation
(Yearbook of Educational Statistics 1995 ). Each district on average contains 32 schools to which an average of
16,427 students were randomly assigned. As a result, each school was placed a total of 513 incoming students on
average.
12For example, if there are 100 students in grade 7 and 10 classes to be formed in grade 8, the student who
performed best in the end-of-grade-7 exam is assigned to Class 1, the second-best student to Class 2, the 10th
student to Class 10, the 11th student to Class 1 (or 10) and so forth.
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in the manner of ability mixing) to meet a new peer group and teachers. This institutional
structure and the class formation procedure yield the exogenous formation of one’s classroom
peer group during the entire middle-school period in South Korea.
With a slight revision in 1996, most of the school assignment and class formation procedures
described previously are also practiced nowadays. Staring from 1996, the government slightly
modifies the student placement in a district in such a way that it accommodates the needs of
individual students and parents that had been ignored in the old system: the government allows
the student to indicate her preference for a few (two to five) schools within the relevant school
district; the attending school is likewise randomly determined among those indicated by the
student. Traditional ability mixing within middle school, however, has changed little since the
recent revision of the district-level placement. Our study is not affected by this revision in 1996,
because it examines students who attended middle schools during 1995.
4 Empirical Framework
In this paper we examine a model of educational production given by:
yij = β0 +Xiβ1 + Piβ2 + Ziβ3 + Tijβ4 + τj + uij . (1)
Here, yij is the standardized math score of student i in school j; Xi is a vector of i’s personal
and family background; Pi is a vector of i’s peer-group variables related to math score (specified
below in detail); Zi is a vector of i’s exogenous peer-group variables other than Pi; Tij is a
vector of i’s teacher, class and school characteristics; τj is a school fixed effect of j13; and uij
is the random error term.14 We suppose that uij is further decomposed into ²1ij and ²2ij . ²1ij
13Tij and τj control for the association of peer achievements that may arise because students in a school
share common environments and resources—the correlated effects (Manski [44]). Zi controls for peer interactions
that can be ascribed to background variables of peers that are exogenously determined (e.g., family income and
education level of peers’ parents)—the contextual (or exogenous) effects (Manski [44]).
14The current specification faces two limitations imposed by the data. First, due to the lack of a measure
available in the data, this specification omits the pre-determined ability of the student that is popularly used
in value-added models. Thus, if a student’s ability is correlated with Pi, our estimate for Pi suffers from bias.
(Studies of peer effects and social interactions often use contemporary measures of peers when there is no pre-
determined variable available (e.g., Case and Katz [10], Gaviria and Raphael [21]).) Nonetheless, as long as the
assignment of peers is independent of a student’s ability, which is the basis of this study, potential bias will be
relatively small in this study (see Table 2 which shows little correlation between peer quality and a student’s own
observable traits). Second, again in the absence of information, we do not control for the effect of a homeroom
teacher—a teacher who is in charge of administrative and disciplinary matters in the class. Such omission may
lead to an overstatement of classroom peer effects. Some related discussions are given in section 4 and footnote
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represents such part of uij that may be correlated with Pi, for example, due to the reflection
problem or common class factors, and ²2ij is the remainder.
We employ two different sets of Pi to examine the existence and detail structure of peer
interactions. First, following many studies on peer effects, we use the average value of math
scores of classroom peers excluding own score (y¯−i), its square term (y¯2−i) and their standard
deviation (y˜−i).15 (Their coefficients are defined as γ1, γ2 and γ3, respectively.) Adding a square
term of the mean value captures potential non-linearity of peer effects. And adding the standard
deviation is to examine the effect of dispersion of peer quality on the student’s achievement.
The second set of Pi is designed to explicitly distinguish between different views on peer
interactions. There are four different (not exhaustive) views on peer interactions: (1) the view
that the strong inspire the learning of both the strong and weak; (2) the view that the strong
inspire the strong’s learning alone, not the weak’s; (3) the view that the weak interrupt the
weak’s learning, not the strong’s; (4) the view that the weak interrupt the learning of both the
strong and weak. These views are related to complementarity versus substitutability of learning
among/between strong and weak students according to Benabou [5]: the more important the
lower (upper) tail of the distribution is in shaping the outcome, the greater the complementarity
(substitutability) between individual contributions (p.589).16 We produce two variables in order
to contrast the four views. One is the proportion of weak peers (excluding oneself) within a
classroom who are below the 25th percentile of the nationwide math score distribution, and the
other is the proportion of strong peers (excluding oneself) who are above the 75th percentile.
The proportion of weak peers reveals the degree of complementarity, while that of strong peers
the degree of substitutability. We test statistical significance of the two parameters and compare
(17). Of course, the needs to include the pre-determined ability of the student and consider the effect of a
homeroom teacher is a possible extension for future research.
15Empirical studies have been employing two different units as a reference group of peers: classroom-level peers
and grade-level peers. Summers and Wolfe [60], Hoxby [32], Hanushek et al. [30] and Angrist and Lang [2] use
grade-level peers, while Zimmer and Toma [64], Boozer and Cacciola [8] and Lefgren [42] rely on classroom-level
peers. Both classroom-level and grade-level peers are examined in Betts and Zau [7] and Vigdor and Nechyba [62].
No consensus seems to exist as to which reference group is more important to a student’s achievement and which
one should be used in empirical analysis. For our analysis, we use classroom-level peers, not grade-level peers.
The reason is that (1) the nature of ordinary middle school classrooms in South Korea—students staying in a
classroom, while teachers visiting it for instruction—dictates the selection, and that (2) only classroom peers are
available from the data.
16For example, different methods of producing a same commodity are substitutes for each other, since the
best innovation is incorporated into the next generation’s know-how; a pair of shoes are complements, since the
entire quality is determined by that of a worse side. In a similar vein, Zimmer and Toma [64] and Winston and
Zimmerman [63] associate the different views on peer interactions with “peer distance”—how far apart the peers
are in their behavior. As explained below in greater detail, the coefficient (γ3) of the dispersion of peer quality
used in the first set of Pi also shows the relative importance of complementarity and substitutability in learning.
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their magnitudes to examine which direction of peer interaction is stronger.
There are three major difficulties for consistent estimation. First, it is possible thatE(Piτj) 6=
0. This arises because students in a school share similar characteristics that are not measured
by controlled variables. It may also take place due to sorting by parents into neighborhoods and
school districts. Second, there may be unobservable factors that commonly affect all students
in the same class. For example, a good math teacher raises the achievement of a student as well
as her classmates. Although we attempt to control for teacher effects by means of observable
variables (Tij), they may not be sufficient. Recent research shows that unobservable teacher
effects matter in student performance (Rivkin et al. [54], Rockoff [56]). Third, if there truly
exist peer interactions, a student’s own outcome is affected by the performance of peers, which
is also affected by her own behavior (the reflection problem, Manski [44]). This problem espe-
cially arises for the relationship between yij and y¯−i, creating simultaneous determination of
own outcome and the outcome of peers. This leads us to non-identifiability of the true (causal)
parameter γ1 (Moffitt [51]).
For estimation of peer interactions, we first use OLS methods. To handle non-zero correlation
between Pi and τj , we employ the fixed-effects method: we control for τj by assigning a dummy
variable for each j (Hanushek et al. [30], Lefgren [42], Arcidiacono and Nicholson [3]). To the
extent that overall differences in achievement across schools are accounted for by school fixed
effects, peer effects in our models are identified by between-classroom variation in peer quality
within a school. As long as E(Pi²2ij |τj) = 0, which would be a reasonable assumption given
the randomization within a school and a school district, we obtain an estimate for β2, which
is not contaminated by the problems due to correlated unobservables and sorting into a school
district—two major sources of potential bias in peer effects studies.
Although OLS methods under quasi-randomization of peers has its own merits, the estimate
γ̂1 for y¯−i may have yet to show the true causal relationship between peers’ and own outcomes
for other two reasons (E(y¯−i²1ij) 6= 0): unobservable factors common in a class and the reflection
problem. In order to handle such problems, we employ instrumental variables (IV) methods.
Specifically, exploiting the fact that both math and science test scores are available for each
student in the data, we use the mean science score of peers (y¯s−i) as an IV for the mean math
score of peers (y¯m−i). If school fixed effects are controlled for and class-specific factors such as
the quality of subject teachers are independent between math and science classes within school,
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y¯s−i will be highly correlated with y¯
m
−i, but is not likely to influence i’s math achievement and
its error term (uij) in equation (1). To the extent that y¯s−i is related to i’s math achievement
solely through y¯m−i, it serves as a good IV and enables a causal interpretation for the estimate
γ̂1.17 In addition to y¯s−i, we also add the standard deviation of science scores of peers (y˜
s
−i) as
an IV for y¯m−i in order to generate an over-identified model.
In preceding estimations, we specify that the relationship between Pi and yij are common
for every student. On the contrary, the impact of peers is likely to be heterogeneous and vary
according to the achievement level of the student. For instance, improvement (deterioration)
in peer quality may have a larger positive (negative) impact on weak students than on strong
students. And the presence of weak students is likely to be more detrimental for weak students
than for strong students. To investigate heterogeneous effects of peer interactions over students
with differing ability levels, we employ a (conditional) quantile regression technique. This
method highlights the correlation between Pi and yij at different quantiles of the math-score
distribution. To deal with the endogeneity of y¯m−i in quantile regressions, we employ instrumental
quantile regression (IVQR) methods proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen [12, 13].
5 Data
5.1 Description of the Data
For the empirical analysis, we employ data from the Third International Mathematics and Sci-
ence Study (TIMSS)—the tests conducted internationally by the International Association for
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) for 41 countries in 1994 and 1995.18 For
the countries participating in the study, mathematics and science tests were administered to
17We thank a referee for suggesting y¯s−i as an IV for y¯
m
−i. As the referee points out, a limitation of using
y¯s−i as an IV is that the IV estimate γ̂1 may be biased if there are learning shocks that affect all subjects—for
example, capability of the homeroom teacher or poor lighting in the classroom. In the data, we have no good
tools to consider them. In addition to y¯s−i, one might want to use exogenous peer variables in Zi as IVs for
y¯m−i, since they may also be correlated with y¯
m
−i and exogenous to uij . In fact, their OLS estimates of equation
(1) are not significant if school fixed effects are controlled for (see Table 4 below). There are, however, two
problems with this approach. First, the insignificant OLS estimate β̂3 does not necessarily imply the exogeneity
of Zi in (1). The consistency of β̂3 depends upon the exogeneity of other explanatory variables and that of y¯
m
−i
in particular, the violation of which is the very reason to invoke IV methods. Second, the bulk of empirical
research shows that contextual factors have independent effects on student outcome (Jencks and Mayer [35],
Chase-Lansdale and Gordon [11], Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn [39]). Recent research on random assignment
to a neighborhood also raises questions about independence between Zi and children’s educational outcomes
(Kaufman and Rosenbaum [37], Currie and Yelowitz [16], Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn [40]).
18See Martin and Kelly [49] and Gonzalez and Smith [25] for details of the database.
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three different populations toward the end of the school year: (1) Population 1: 9-year-old
students, (2) Population 2: 13-year-old students, (3) Population 3: students in the final year of
secondary education. In addition to the tests, TIMSS gathered detailed background informa-
tion through separate student, teacher and school-principal questionnaires. This information is
combined with an individual student’s test outcomes. For the empirical analysis, we focus on
the mathematics test scores collected for the 13-year-old students who were attending middle
school (grades 7 and 8) at the time of the study.19
The TIMSS data were constructed by a three-level sampling: school, class and student.
And appropriate weights were assigned at each level of sampling.20 In case of South Korea,
just like other ordinary participating countries, a total of 150 middle schools were selected
(by the stratified sampling) nationwide, and two classes (one from grades 7 and 8 each) were
sampled at random from each school. For other TIMSS-participating countries, all students of
each sampled classroom were tested. For South Korea, however, not all students in a sampled
classroom participated in the tests. About a third of all students were randomly selected for the
tests, and the actual number of tested students varied from 15 to 20. Each student in a sampled
classroom was assigned the weight in order to reflect the population of the classroom. In this
study, we inflate the raw class-level data by the within-class student weight for estimation.21
Although we are mainly interested in what happens within a classroom rather than a school or
a nation in this study, we also use other weights, when they are more appropriate to show a
national-level trend in educational characteristics (e.g., Table 3).
Since the math test was administered to two different grades, we standardize the math
score using its grade-specific mean and standard deviation.22 In order to maintain homogeneity
19Two reasons can be offered for our focus on mathematics test scores. First, a large body of literature reports
that mathematics test scores have a significant bearing on a student’s labor market performance (Grogger and
Eide [26], Mumane et al. [52]). Hence mathematics among other subjects is likely to be a major focus of concern
by schools, parents and students. Second, as a rule in South Korea, mathematics is instructed by one mathematics
teacher to a whole class, while science subjects are taught by several teachers of different fields. Therefore, the
influence of teachers, if any, can be better understood in mathematics than in science subjects.
20The three different weight variables are the following. The first is School Weighting Factor (WGTFAC1) and
its adjustment (WGTADJ1), whose multiplication produces the sampling weight for the school. The second is the
Class Weighting Factor (WGTFAC2), which reflects the selection probability of the classroom within the school.
The third is Student Weighting Factor (WGTFAC3) and its adjustment (WGTADJ3), whose product shows the
selection probability of the individual student within a classroom. Obtained from these weight variables is Total
Student Weight (TOTWGT), which shows the sampling weight of an individual student in a country’s entire
population.
21Specifically, we use the integer part of [ Student Weighting Factor(WGTFAC3) × Student Weighting Ad-
justment (WGTADJ3) + 0.5 ] to inflate the raw class-level data.
22The weighted (by Total Student Weight(TOTWGT)) mean and standard deviation of the scores are 580.0
and 104.1 for grade 7, respectively. The corresponding figures for grade 8 are 610.2 and 108.5, respectively.
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of schools, we restrict our analysis to non-rural schools. Due to this restriction, we exclude
about 17.4 percent (= 100× 5,827−4,8135,827 ) of observations from the unweighted sample and about
13.4 percent (= 100× 15,698−13,59815,698 ) from the weighted (by within-class student weight) sample.
Descriptive statistics of the main sample used for the analysis are shown in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
The overall mean of the standardized math scores is slightly higher than zero, as the sample
is restricted to non-rural schools, and the overall standard deviation is nearly one. The average
age of students is 13.6, reflecting the design of TIMSS, and the share of male students is 0.56.
Around 70 percent of parents are educated at least up to the upper secondary level, and half
of the students own more than 100 books in the home. About 40 percent of students have a
computer at home. Students are equally divided between the two grades. As for the teacher’s
characteristics, a half of students are taught by male teachers, and 10 percent is taught by
teachers holding a post-graduate degree. The average experience of teachers is 12.3 years. The
average class size is 55.8, which is quite high by international standard, though it reflects the
corresponding national figure 48.2 (Yearbook of Educational Statistics, 1995 ). (Higher class size
of the sample is due to the restriction to non-rural schools.) South Korean middle schools are
divided by gender. Students attending boys-only schools occupy 37 percent of the sample, while
those attending girls-only and coed schools account for 34 and 29 percent, respectively. Among
non-rural school students, 65 percent go to schools close to the center of a town/city.
5.2 Evidence of Randomization
In order to empirically verify the random and exogenous determination of peer groups, we first
run regressions of peer variables (Pi) on a student’s personal and family traits and her math
teacher’s characteristics. Note that, as the regressions control for school fixed effects, the coeffi-
cients show the average partial correlation between the peer variable and various characteristics
within school. If assignment of peers is truly random within school, peer variables should have
no systematic association with both observable and unobservable characteristics of a student, as
long as the school effects are controlled for. Here, however, we check the correlation between the
peer variable and a student’s observable traits alone, assuming that no such association implies
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randomization along the unobservable dimension. Table 2 presents fairly convincing evidence
of randomization of peers within South Korean middle school.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.
The mean (y¯−i) and standard deviation (y˜−i) of math scores of peers have little significant
correlation with a student’s personal and family traits. The only exception is the dummy
for both parents being present in the peer-mean equation, which shows a positive association.
Teacher variables are not systematically correlated with peer quality as well. F-tests confirm
that the controlled student and teacher characteristics are not jointly systematically associated
with the mean and dispersion of peer quality.
The proportions of weak and strong peers within classroom also appear to be uncorrelated
with observable student and teacher variables. Exceptions are the dummies of both parents
being present and father’s education level in the weak-peers-proportion equation. However,
father’s education level shows an unexpected direction given that educated parents are less
likely to put their child in a class with a high proportion of weak peers. Overall, the assignment
of peers in South Korean middle school appears to be nearly random as a result of the unique
system of student allocation in a school district and the paucity of ability grouping in middle
school.
Given that South Korea adopts a unique system of student placement, it would be inter-
esting to see the features of its classrooms from an international perspective. In Table 3 we
calculate two indices to show the ability-mixed nature of South Korean middle school and their
classroom. We compare the indices of South Korea with those of other Asian and Western
TIMSS-participating countries.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.
The first index is the proportion of overall variance of math scores that is attributed to
within-class (or within-school) variance as opposed to between-class (or between-school) vari-
ance.23 When ability mixing is widespread in a country, we expect a high fraction of within-class
23We decompose the total weighted (by Total Student Weight (TOTWGT)) variance of math test scores into











(or school) variance in total national variance of test scores. In contrast, when ability grouping
is widely applied, the proportion of within-class (or school) variance will be relatively low, since
similar-ability students will be gathered within a classroom (or a school).
For South Korea, over 95 percent of the overall variance of math scores in non-rural schools
is explained by within-classroom variance. In other words, less than 5 percent of the overall
variance is explained by between-classroom variance. Within-variance occupies the same pro-
portion in overall variance when we use the school as a unit. This implies that in South Korea,
non-rural middle schools and their classrooms are attended by students of varying abilities due
to the unique placement system and rare ability grouping of students. South Korea’s propor-
tion of the within-classroom (or school) variance is the highest among TIMSS-participating
countries. To compare with other Asian countries, Japan shows similar features to Korea,
while Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong display relatively low within-classroom/school vari-
ances. Among Western countries, Denmark displays high within-classroom/school variances,
while Netherlands, Germany, and U.S.A show low within variances.
The second index is based on the school questionnaire that was administered to school
principals to ask whether students followed the same course of study in mathematics. Same
(different) courses of study imply ability mixing (grouping). We calculate the weighted (by
Total Student Weight (TOTWGT)) proportion of students who were educated under the same
course of mathematics as another index of ability mixing for each country. Such a proportion
for South Korea and Japan is equal to one, implying that every student experience the same
course of math study under little grouping. Singapore among Asian countries, and U.K., U.S.A,
and Netherlands among Western countries have low rates of the same course in math, which
suggests that students experience grouping according to their different math capabilities.
In sum, the preceding two indices show the ability-mixed nature of middle school and its
classroom in South Korea. Institutionally, this stems from nearly random assignment of students
to schools and classrooms.
where σ2 is the overall variance of math test scores, Fj is the fraction of students in classroom (or school) j,
mj and σ
2
j are the mean and variance, respectively, of the test score within j, and m¯ is the overall mean. The





2. Here we employ the non-rural sample of




6.1 Average Effects of Peers
6.1.1 Association between Mean Score of Peers and Own Average Outcome
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE.
Table 4 shows the estimation results of OLS regressions for equation (1).24 Columns (1)-
(3) do not control for school fixed effects, while columns (4)-(6) include them as explanatory
variables. Column (4) is employed in order to indirectly show within-school randomization
of peers: when peers are exogenously assigned to a student within school and school fixed
effects are controlled for in the estimation, the estimates for Pi should be close across different
specifications whether or not student and teacher variables are included.
When we do not control for school effects (τj = 0 for all j) and the contextual components
of peer effects (β3 = 0), the mean value of math scores of peers has a positive correlation with
a student’s own math score. According to column (2) of Table 4, the estimate γ̂1 implies that
a one standard deviation (SD) greater mean math score of peers is associated with a 0.55 SD
higher own score. In terms of raw scores, a 106.5-point greater mean score of peers is associated
with around a 58.6-point higher math score of a student. Such an association is significantly
different from zero. In addition, there is no evidence that the effect of peers’ mean outcome has
a nonlinear structure as far as the average outcome of a student is concerned. The dispersion
of peers’ scores also fails to have a significant impact on a student’s own average achievement.
When the contextual components (Zi) are additionally controlled for in column (3), the
degree of peer interactions rises and the estimate γ̂1 becomes 0.653 (s.e. 0.032). The proportion
of male and other background variables of classroom peers are jointly significant. Although
students are randomized across classrooms within school, they may not be randomly assigned
across school districts due to endogenous residential sorting. This concern invokes the possibility
of E(Piτj) 6= 0 and calls for the control for school fixed effects.
When school fixed effects are included in the regressions, the magnitude of association be-
tween peers’ mean outcome and own achievement falls by more than a half. When no student
24Since there are multiple observations for each school and each class, the standard errors for OLS and IV
estimates are adjusted for robustness and clustering at the classroom level. When the school level is used for
clustering adjustment, the results remain qualitatively similar.
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and teacher variables are controlled for in the regression, the estimate γ̂1 is 0.344 (s.e 0.058)
in column (4). This amount is fairly close to and statistically indistinguishable from the cor-
responding estimates (in columns (5) and (6)) obtained when student and teacher variables
are included in the estimation. Such closeness of the estimates indirectly shows near random-
ization of peers within South Korean middle school. When student and teacher variables are
controlled for in the regressions, the estimate γ̂1 remains between 0.258 and 0.267, whether or
not contextual influences, which become negligible once the school effects are controlled for,
are considered.25 The estimates imply that a one SD greater mean score of peers is associated
with a 0.26 to 0.27 SD higher own score.26 And they are significantly different from zero. As
previously discussed, these amounts may not be interpreted as causal due to unobservable fac-
tors common in a class and the reflection problem. Nonetheless, they are informative of true
peer interactions because the estimates are less vulnerable to residential sorting by parents and
student grouping in school.
Similar to the results without school fixed effects, there is no evidence suggesting a nonlin-
earity of peer effects with regard to average math score of a student. In addition, a student’s
own outcome is not significantly affected by the dispersion of peers’ scores within classroom.
The finding that γ1 > 0, γ2 = 0 and γ3 = 0 is often interpreted as suggesting that regrouping of
students by the achievement level may be a zero-sum game where gains and losses between weak
and strong students are offset without generating extra overall benefits. We, however, argue
that the implication of this finding for the mixing-versus-grouping controversy requires further
consideration, as the change in class format accompanies the shift in the entire distribution of
peer quality. We revisit this issue when we discuss quantile regression results.
25Insignificant contextual peer impacts are in contrast with studies reporting their (positive) effects on a
student’s academic outcome (Vandenberghe [61], McEwan [50], Robertson and Symons [55]). In view of our
study, their estimates appear to be subject to an upward bias as they fail to completely remove unobservable
components shared by peers.
26In the math score term, our estimates indicate that a 1-point greater mean score of peers is associated with
about a 0.26-point higher own score. This amount of peer interaction is slightly lower than, but comparable to
the estimates of other studies using US elementary schools and an international data set. As for the results based
on US elementary schools, Hoxby [32] presents a 0.1 to 0.55-point increase in own score in association with a
1-point increase in mean score of peers. Boozer and Cacciola [8, Table 4] show roughly a 0.6-point greater own
math score in association with a 1-point increase in mean score of classroom peers. Hanushek et al. [30, Table
I] show about a 0.4-point increase in own math score in relation to a 1-point increase in mean score of peers.
Vigdor and Nechyba [62, Table 6] report a 1-point increase in peers’ mean score is associated with a 0.07-point
increase in own math score. From an international data set, Zimmer and Toma [64, Table 1] show that a 1-point
higher mean score of peers leads to a 0.6-0.8 point increase in own math score.
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6.1.2 Causal Effect of Peer Quality on Student Outcome
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.
Here we examine the results of IV estimations explained in section 4. OLS results of the
reduced form equations and IV results of the structural equations are presented in Table 5. For
simplicity of analysis, only the linear term y¯−i is controlled for in estimation, while school fixed
effects are also included.
Similar to that in column (6) of Table 4, the OLS estimate γ̂1 is 0.254 (s.e. 0.059) in column
(1) of Table 5. When the mean science score of peers (y¯s−i) is included as an extra regressor,
its estimate in column (2) is not significantly different from zero, while the estimate γ̂1 slightly
falls. If SD of peers’ science scores (y˜s−i) is added, its estimate in column (3) is not significantly
different from zero as well. Although examining the significance of the estimates for y¯s−i and y˜
s
−i
in OLS regressions is not a formal test for exogeneity of instruments—the consistency of their
OLS estimates depends upon the exogeneity of other explanatory variables, the findings may be
informative of the possibility that both y¯s−i and y˜
s
−i are uncorrelated with uij in equation (1).
The first-stage results of the reduced form equations for y¯m−i are given in columns (4) and
(5). SD of peers’ science scores (y˜s−i) is not included in column (4), while included in column
(5). When y¯s−i alone is used as an IV for y¯
m
−i as in column (4), the estimate for y¯
s
−i implies that
a one SD greater mean science score of peers is associated with a 0.64 SD higher mean math
score of peers. And the correlation is significantly different from zero. Since the F-statistic for
the significance of y¯s−i is 168, which is far above a rule-of-thumb threshold, 10 (Stock et al. [59]),




−i is added as another IV for y¯
m
−i as in column (5),
the estimate for y¯s−i has similar size to that in column (4) and it is significant. The estimate for
y˜s−i is, however, statistically insignificant while it is negatively related with y¯
m
−i. In column (5)
y¯s−i and y˜
s
−i are jointly strong instruments, since the F-statistic for joint significance of these
two variables is 85. Thus, as long as y¯s−i as well as y˜
s
−i is exogenous to uij , they are legitimate
IVs for y¯m−i.
IV estimates γ̂1 are shown in columns (6) and (7). The estimates in column (6) are based on
the first-stage specification in column (4), while those in column (7) are based on column (5).
IV estimates γ̂1 suggest that an improvement in peer quality reflected by a one SD increase in
mean math score of peers enhances a student’s own math score by a 0.31 SD. In TIMSS scale,
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a 106.5-point increase in mean math score of peers leads to a 33-point improvement in own
math score. Furthermore, such a relationship is quite precisely estimated. From the results in
column (7) we can apply an over-identification test; the test statistic and its p-value are 0.309
and 0.579, respectively. Thus the test does not reject the exogeneity of both instruments y¯s−i
and y˜s−i; since they are strongly correlated with y¯
m
−i, this implies that both instruments are valid
IVs for y¯m−i.
Once IV estimates are obtained, we can also apply Hausman tests for the exogeneity of y¯m−i
in equation (1). From the results in columns (6) and (7), the tests do not reject the exogeneity
of y¯m−i. Therefore, we conclude that the endogeneity of y¯
m
−i in equation (1) is not a great concern
for consistent estimation, as long as school fixed effects are controlled for in estimation.
6.1.3 Effect of Strong and Weak Peers on Own Average Outcome
While one acknowledges the presence of peer academic interactions within classroom, she may
be interested in relative importance of strong and weak peers to a student. Strong students are
likely to interact more closely with other strong students than with weak students, in which case
their performance will be little affected by weak peers—learning is substitutable among strong
students. Alternatively, weak students may be more severely (than strong students) affected
by weak peers within classroom—learning is complementary among weak students. Although a
full investigation of this issue requires quantile regressions, it is necessary to check the overall
patterns with respect to the average achievement of a student. Table 6 shows the estimation
results.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE.
When we do not control for school effects, both proportions of strong peers and weak peers
are shown to have a strong correlation with a student’s own outcome. From columns (2) and
(3), a 10-percentage-point higher proportion of weak peers within classroom is associated with
a 0.07 to 0.09 SD lower own math score. A 10-percentage-point higher proportion of strong
peers is associated with a 0.07 to 0.08 SD higher own math score. Both of these results are
statistically significant at one percent level. And a test does not reject symmetric impacts of
strong and weak peers on a student. This implies that a change in own outcome due to an
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increasing proportion of weak peers is offset by the same amount of a decreasing proportion of
strong peers.
When school effects are considered, the patterns remain unaltered, although the magnitude
declines by more than a half. The proportion of weak peers decreases a student’s own outcome,
while that of strong students increases it. And the assignment of peers appears nearly random,
as the coefficients of Pi are fairly close across different specifications. Whether or not student
and teacher variables are controlled for, a 10-percentage-point increase in weak (strong) peers is
associated with roughly a 0.03-0.04 SD lower (higher) own math score. Statistical significance,
however, remains at the borderline if student and teacher variables are included in the regression.
There also exist symmetric impacts of strong and weak peers on a student’s average score. In
other words, on average, complementarity is as large as substitutability for a student’s learning.
6.2 Effects of Peers at Different Quantiles
In section 6.1, we suppose that the coefficients of peer variables are common for all levels of
student ability. Unlike this assumption, the impacts of peers are likely to vary, depending on the
achievement level of the student. Such heterogeneity of peer interactions can be considered in
quantile regressions (QR). The potential endogeneity of y¯m−i is taken into account by instrumental
quantile regressions (IVQR).27
6.2.1 Effect of the Mean Quality of Peers on Various Quantiles
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE.
Table 7 shows the effects of mean and SD of math scores of peers at five quantiles: 0.1, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles. Panel A reports the estimates of ordinary QR that does not control
for school effects, while panel B reports those of ordinary QR that does. Panel C presents the
estimates of IVQR that controls for school effects. For all estimations, we use a linear term of
y¯m−i, since its square terms are rarely significant.
Similar to the findings for the average outcome in Table 4, the QR estimates for y¯m−i fall at
each and every quantile by more than a half when school fixed effects are controlled for. This
27In order to consider clustering at the class level in calculating QR and IVQR standard errors, we employ a
clustered bootstrap method: we first draw students with replacement from the sample of classrooms; QR and
IVQR are performed for each bootstrap sample to calculate the standard deviation of the estimates. The number
of bootstrap samples is 50.
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suggests that sorting of students across schools takes place for all levels of student achievement.
When school effects are taken into account, the performance of weak students at the 0.1 and
0.25 quantiles is strongly related to mean achievement of classroom peers. A one SD greater
mean math score of peers is associated with a 0.36 and 0.24 SD higher math score at the 0.1 and
0.25 quantiles, respectively. The math score of the median student is also strongly correlated
with mean performance of peers. In addition, the performance of strong students at the 0.75
and 0.9 quantiles is similarly related to mean quality of classroom peers. A one SD greater
mean math score of peers is associated with a 0.24 and 0.21 SD higher math score at the 0.75
and 0.9 quantiles, respectively.
Dispersion in peers’ quality also shows impacts that substantially vary according to the
achievement level of the student. The estimates in panel B imply that a 1-unit greater SD of
math scores of peers decreases a student’s score at the 0.1 quantile by a 0.73 SD and at the
0.25 quantile by a 0.2 SD. In contrast, a 1-unit greater SD of math scores of peers increases
the 0.75 quantile by a 0.28 SD and the 0.9 quantile by a 0.33 SD. That is, when the average
peer quality is kept constant, increased heterogeneity of peer quality harms weak students, but
benefits strong students.
IVQR estimates of y¯m−i are presented in panel C. According to Chernozhukov and Hansen [12,
13], IVQR is implemented in the following two steps28:
(1) Define Φ̂i is the OLS projection of y¯m−i on all exogenous variables including IVs.
29 For
a given quantile index q, define a grid of values {γh1 , h = 1, · · · ,H}, and run the ordinary
q-quantile regression of (Yij − y¯m−iγh1 ) on Xi, y˜m−i, Zi, Tij , τj and Φ̂i to obtain their estimates.
(2) Choose γ1(q) as the value among {γh1 , h = 1, · · · ,H} that makes the estimate for Φ̂i
in (1) closest to zero. The estimates of other variables are obtained from the same QR in (1)
whereby γ1(q) is produced.
According to Table 7, the IVQR estimates of y˜m−i only slightly change from the ordinary QR
estimates, but the IVQR estimates of y¯m−i in panel C show some differences from the ordinary
QR estimates in panel B. While the IV 0.1-quantile estimate γ̂1 is similar to its ordinary QR
counterpart, the IVQR estimates for γ1 increases by more than 50 percent at the 0.25 and 0.5
28Computer codes for performing IVQR are obtained from the web site “http://www.gsb.uchicago.edu/fac/
christian.hansen /research/.” We thank Christian Hansen for sharing the computer codes.
29For our IVQR estimation, we use both y¯s−i and y˜
s




−i alone as an IV does not
alter the main results. Such results are available upon request.
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quantiles. The estimates suggest that a one SD increase in mean quality of peers enhances
the math scores at the 0.25 and 0.5 quantiles by 0.47 and 0.42 SD, respectively. And the
estimates are quite precisely estimated. In contrast, the IVQR estimates for γ1 for the 0.75 and
0.9 quantiles reduce close to zero and even become negative, although not significant. These
estimates suggest that mean quality of peers does not affect math achievement of strong students
at the 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles.
Nevertheless, our IVQR results are largely in line with ordinary QR results. While strong
students above the 0.75 quantile are not affected by mean quality of peers, weak and median
students around and below the 0.5 quantile are strongly affected by it. Thus, there is asymmetry
of peer interactions across strong and weak students with respect to mean peer quality. As for
the effect of peer heterogeneity, when mean peer quality is kept constant, rising heterogeneity of
peer quality harms weak students, but benefits strong students. To summarize, weak students
are susceptible to peer influence: they are affected by both mean and dispersion of peer quality.
In contrast, strong students are less susceptible: they are not affected by mean peer quality, but
by dispersion of peer quality alone.
6.2.2 Interpretation Issues
Based on a hypothetical experiment that attempts to measure a change in a student’s outcome
when she is relocated between mixed and grouped (or tracked) classes, many studies on peer
effects suggest that the observed partial association between y¯−i and y˜−i, on the one hand, and
yij , on the other, have direct policy implications for ability mixing and grouping in education
(Henderson et al. [31], Glewwe [24], Zimmer and Toma [64], Hanushek et al. [30], Vigdor and
Nechyba [62]). Given a pool of students, however, a mixed classroom provides the student with
a medium average peer quality and high heterogeneity, while a grouped classroom provides her
with either high or low average peer quality and low heterogeneity (see Figure 130).
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
30From the figure, when the class format changes from a mixing to a grouping system given the same pool of
students, the distribution of a student’s peer quality changes from (1) to (2) if she is relocated to a high-track
classroom, and from (1) to (3) if relocated to a low-track classroom. Compared with a mixed classroom, the
average and dispersion of peer quality is small and the fraction of weak (strong) peers is high (low) in a low-track
classroom. Again, compared with a mixed classroom, the average of peer quality is large, its dispersion is small
and the fraction of weak (strong) peers is low (high) in a high-track classroom.
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Given that the entire distribution of peer quality varies between ability mixed and grouped
classrooms, rather than directly supporting ability mixing, the condition that γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0
and γ3 > 0 simply implies that a student benefits from mixing when she moves from a low-track
classroom—with low average and low heterogeneity of peer quality—to a mixed classroom—
with medium average and high heterogeneity of peer quality. (Recall that γ1, γ2 and γ3 are the
coefficients of y¯−i, y¯2−i and y˜−i, respectively, in (1).) If the student switches from a high-track
to a mixed classroom, she may experience a loss. Overall effectiveness of mixing and grouping
depends on the proportions of those experiencing gains and losses and their relative sizes. In a
similar manner, rather than supporting grouping, the condition that γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0 and γ3 < 0
suggests that a student benefits (may suffer) from grouping when she moves from a mixed to
a high-track (low-track) classroom. The condition that γ1 > 0, γ2 = 0 and γ3 = 0 does not
necessarily imply a zero-sum nature of regrouping students. It is possible that γ3 < 0 for weak
students and γ3 > 0 for strong students drive γ3 = 0 at the mean (or at the median). Finally,
an interpretation based on either γ1 and γ2, or γ3 alone is even more ambiguous.
Rather than having a direct bearing on ability mixing and grouping in education, we
argue that γ3 reveals the nature of learning that arises from interactions among students—
complementarity and substitutability. That is, a positive γ3 shows substitutability in learning,
and a negative γ3 complementarity. (Recall that the more important the lower (upper) tail of
the distribution is in shaping the outcome, the greater the complementarity (substitutability).)
Holding its average fixed, rising (falling) heterogeneity in peer quality means that a student has
an increasing (decreasing) degree of contact with both worst-performing and best-performing
peers, provided that the distribution of peer quality spreads symmetrically. If a student in-
teracts more closely with best-performing peers than with worst-performing peers—learning is
substitutable, γ3 will be positive. If a student is more affected by worst-performing peers than
by best-performing peers—learning is complementary, γ3 will be negative.
Our interpretation of the estimates gives rise to policy implications that are conflicting with
the conventional ones. As shown in Table 7, a negative γ3 is shown for weak students, while
a positive γ3 for strong students. According to conventional interpretations (e.g., Vigdor and
Nechyba [62, p.22]), weak students are better off when they are educated in a grouped classroom
(most likely a low-track) rather than in a mixed classroom. And strong students benefit from
a mixed classroom rather than from a grouped classroom (most likely a high-track). On the
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contrary, our interpretation indicates that weak students are likely to be worse off in a grouped
classroom. Under a grouping system, weak students are likely to be assigned to a low-track
classroom in which they are exposed to a more frequent contact with other weak and worst-
performing peers; hence they suffer negative impacts of grouping.31 Similarly, grouping is likely
to enhance the performance of strong students, since they will have more frequent contact with
best-performing peers in a high-track classroom; hence they enjoy positive impacts of grouping.
The median student showing γ3 = 0 seems to display complementarity and substitutability in an
offsetting manner.32 They will gain from the transfer from a mixed classroom to a high-track,
but will lose from the movement to a low-track.
As noted by Benabou [5] and Lazear [41], the overall performance of mixing and grouping
systems is determined by the degree of complementarity and substitutability in education. Given
that the strength of each function varies according to the ability level of the student, it is difficult
to determine uniformly one system over the other. A specific design of each system in terms of
the mean and dispersion of peers’ quality and the fractions of strong and weak students makes
a difference in overall performance of each system. Therefore, the ultimate evaluation of the
two class formats depends on the detail design of each.
In the Appendix, we attempt a tentative assessment of the overall performance of ability
grouping and mixing, employing a simulation based on the raw data and the estimates obtained
from quantile regressions. In this evaluation, we try to consider explicitly the difference in
entire distribution of peer quality between the two systems (e.g., the fractions of strong and
weak students in the classroom). The simulation results suggest that ability mixing may perform
better than grouping in terms of mean outcome.33
31Here, we ignore a possibility that, as proponents of grouping argue, schools adopting grouping align their
resources and instruction styles to the ability level of the student. If this is a case, we cannot rule out a possibility
that a negative impact of grouping on weak students can be overturned.
32Alternatively, γ3 = 0 for the median student may also mean that there exist no complementarity and
substitutability for her learning. Given that each of them is found to function for other weak and strong students,
however, we believe this interpretation makes less sense. We show below that the median student simultaneously
and closely interacts with both weak and strong peers in a similar degree.
33We wish to emphasize that this evaluation is nothing but tentative. First, as mentioned in footnote (31),
once the grouping policy is adopted in a school, the school and teachers will surely align and optimize their
resources and instruction styles to take into account the type and ability level of children in each class. Such
changes are completely ignored in the simulation. Second, our current estimates of peer variables are obtained
using relatively small degrees of variation in peer quality under a mixing system. Thus if the level of peer quality
under hypothetical grouping is located outside the boundary currently observed in the data, the current estimates
may no longer be valid, and the final outcome of each system may be biased. Third, quantile effects are different
from average effects. While the latter can be used to build a counterfactual outcome of the same individual, the
former may not be used for the same purpose. In the simulation, we have abused QR estimates as if they were
OLS estimates. For an example of the evaluation for ability mixing as opposed to grouping based on an actual
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6.2.3 Effect of Strong and Weak Peers on Various Quantiles
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE.
Using the second set of Pi, we confirm the interpretation suggested above and the asym-
metric nature of learning for strong and weak students. In Table 8, we show that learning is
complementary among weak students at lower quantiles, but substitutable among strong stu-
dents at higher quantiles. And the complementarity among the weak is found to be greater
than substitutability among the strong.
According to the bottom panel, for weak students at the 0.1 and 0.25 quantiles, a 10-
percentage-point increase in weak peers is associated with a 0.07 SD lower own math score.
However, the increase in strong peers within classroom does not make a significant difference
in own outcome of weak students. For strong students at the 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles, a 10-
percentage-point increase in strong peers is associated with a 0.04 and 0.05 SD higher own
math score, respectively. While the 0.9 quantile is positively affected by weak peers,34 the 0.75
quantile is not significantly related with the proportion of weak peers. Such findings largely
support the second and third view of peer interactions in section 4—the view that the strong
inspire the strong’s learning alone, not the weak’s, and that the weak interrupt the weak’s
learning, not the strong’s.
In addition, the degree of complementarity among weak students is much greater than that
of substitutability among strong students. We see a similar trend in Table 7 in which the 0.1-
quantile estimate for γ3 is larger in absolute value than the 0.9-quantile counterpart. This is
suggestive of larger detrimental effects of ability grouping on weak students than its beneficial
effects on strong students.
The median student is found to interact with both weak and strong peers. And the negative
effect of weak peers seems larger than the positive effect of strong peers. (The claim fails to be
statistically significant at the conventional levels.) That is, learning appears to be slightly more
complementary than substitutable for the median student.
policy change, see Kang et al. [36].
34This finding is a bit puzzling. Nevertheless, it is not inexplicable given a possibility that for a strong student
weakest peers might represent a challenge and a chance to learn-by-teaching (Winston and Zimmerman [63]).
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7 Concluding Remarks
Studies on peer effects are confronted and sometimes plagued by various empirical challenges.
Random assignment of peers to individual students is often wanted for consistent estimation.
Exploiting near randomization of peers that takes place in middle school of South Korea, we
examine whether there exist academic interactions among classroom peers and what form they
specifically take.
First, we find that there do exist academic interactions within classroom. A student’s
achievement (standardized math score) is significantly positively associated with average per-
formance of classroom peers. Employing IV methods, we show that such a relationship is causal:
the improvement in peer quality reflected by a one SD increase in mean math score of peers
enhances a student’s own math score by a 0.30 SD.
Second, using quantile regressions, we also show that the dispersion as well as the average
level of peer quality is significantly associated with students of different achievement levels.
Achievement of weak students is negatively correlated with the dispersion of peer quality within
classroom, while that of strong students is positively correlated. Unlike conventional views
that attempt to directly draw a policy implication for ability mixing and grouping from such
findings, we suggest that these correlations reveal the nature of learning for different-ability stu-
dents: weak students display complementarity and strong students substitutability in learning.
Contrary to earlier interpretations, this implies that weak students are likely to benefit from
ability mixing, while strong students from grouping.
Even if we suggest that ability mixing may benefit weak students and ability grouping strong
students, it is often difficult to choose between ability mixing and grouping as the output-
maximizing class (or school) organization method. Overall performance of ability mixing and
grouping is dependent on many factors: the relative strength of complementarity and substi-
tutability, and the design and student composition of mixed and grouped classrooms. Using a
simulation, we attempt a tentative assessment for ability mixing and grouping, and show that
mixing may perform better than grouping in terms of mean outcome.
The lack of the pre-determined ability of the student in our data may expose this study to
a limitation of omitted variable bias. Nonetheless, we believe that the potential bias is rela-
tively small, since nearly random assignment of peers within middle school of South Korea will
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minimize a possible correlation between peer variables and the student’s ability. Nonetheless,
an investigation that includes the pre-determined ability of a student will be a topic for future
research.
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Appendix
A Tentative Assessment of Mixing and Grouping: A Simulation Approach
In the text we argue that an evaluation of the relative effectiveness of ability mixing and
grouping is limited when it is based on the relationship between average and dispersion of peer
quality, and the student’s own outcome alone.
For an evaluation of ability mixing versus grouping, we propose a new estimation model:
yij = β0 +Xiβ1 +
4∑
k=1
Fkiδk + Ziβ3 + Tijβ4 + τj + uij (2)
where F1 is the fraction of classroom peers whose math scores are below the 25th percentile
of the nationwide math-score distribution; F2 the fraction of those between the 25th and 40th
percentiles; F3 the fraction of those between the 60th and 85th percentiles; and F4 the fraction of
those above the 85th percentile. The fraction of those between the 40th and 60th percentiles are
dropped to avoid collinearity. Using Fk’s, we attempt to directly characterize the distribution
of peer quality within classroom and its potential shift when class formats are changed between
ability mixing and grouping. The smaller the range of Fk, the more closely the distribution
of peer quality is approximated, but the less precise the estimates of δk’s from the OLS and
quantile regressions. The OLS and quantile estimates are shown in Appendix Table 1. They
generally agree with Table 8.
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INSERT Appendix Table 1 HERE.
Given these quantile estimates, we regroup students currently under mixed classrooms to
form two tracked (or grouped) classrooms (one is a high-track and the other is a low-track)
in order to compare overall performance between the mixing system and hypothetical tracking
systems. A current mixed classroom is divided into two tracked classrooms as follows: within
each existing classroom, students whose math score is above α quantile (α ∈ [0, 1]) of within-
classroom distribution of math score are assigned to the high-track classroom and those below
α quantile are assigned to the low-track classroom. By design, the regrouping under α being
equal to 0 or 1 reduces to the existing mixed classrooms. We experiment with five different
values of α: (1) Tracking I under α = 0.1; (2) Tracking II under α = 0.25; (3) Tracking III
under α = 0.5; (4) Tracking IV under α = 0.75; (5) Tracking V under α = 0.9.
In the absence of OLS estimates that associate peer quality with own achievement separately
for different ability levels of students, we use the quantile estimates to obtain the predicted
achievement of each student under the new peer environment. Specifically, given the quantile
estimates and a new set of Fk’s, T and Z under the hypothetical tracking systems, we replace
β and δ in (2) with their quantile estimates, and obtain the predicted achievement of different-
ability students. Since we do not have estimates for every quantile, we employ a rule whereby the
0.1 quantile estimates are assigned to those students whose scores are below the 15th percentile
of within-school distribution of math score, the 0.25 quantile estimates to those between the 15th
and 40th percentiles, the 0.5 quantile estimates to those between the 40th and 60th percentiles,
the 0.75 quantile estimates to those between the 60th and 85th percentiles, and the 0.9 quantile
estimates to those above the 85th percentile.35
Summary statistics of peer variables and the hypothetical achievement of students from five
tracking systems are given in Appendix Table 2.
INSERT Appendix Table 2 HERE.
35There are two problems with this method. First, as we rely on quantile estimates, we basically generate pre-
dicted conditional quantiles of the outcome distribution—not conditional expectations of a student’s outcome—
under the hypothetical tracking systems. Thus an intra-student comparison between the actual score and the
quantile-based predicted score may not be valid. In the absence of valid estimates, we assume that the quantile
estimates are such estimates that relate peer quality with own achievement of the student of different ability
levels. High-quantile estimates are used for high-ability students and low-quantile estimates for low-ability stu-
dents. Second, when there is a strong and substantial interaction between students, the quantile estimates of δk’s
may be biased due to E(Fkij²1ij) 6= 0. In the simulation, we also suppose that the quantile estimates (δ̂k) are
consistent and that they show causal relations between yij and Fk’s.
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The overall average and standard deviation of y¯−i are larger under the hypothetical tracking
than under the existing mixing system. As α increases, the overall average of y¯−i declines and its
standard deviation displays an inverted-U shape. Not surprisingly, the average of y˜−i is smaller
under tracking. It is smallest when α = 0.5. When we look into each track under tracking, the
averages of y¯−i and y˜−i are lower in low-tracks than in the existing mixing system, while they
rise as α increases. The average of y¯−i is higher and that of y˜−i are lower in high-tracks than
in the existing mixing system, while the former rises and the latter falls as α increases.
Overall performance of tracking in terms of the average of hypothetical yij ’s varies under
different tracking systems. Given the current estimates and method of dividing students within
school, the mixing system usually produces higher average outcomes for all levels of α. Depend-
ing on α, the overall average of yij is greater under mixing than under tracking by 0.01 to 0.09
SD. When α is equal to 0.1 and 0.25, the average gap between mixing and tracking is relatively
large (0.04 and 0.09 SD, respectively). The average gap is smaller when α is greater than 0.5.
As α increases, the average gap of low-track students declines as their classroom becomes
closer to the mixed classroom. The average achievement gap of high-track students shows an
inverted-U shape with the highest gain at α = 0.75, as α rises. From these findings, we can
infer that when α is low, that is, when the weakest students are concentrated on the low-track,
complementarity in learning within the low-track dominates substitutability within the high-
track. As α increases, that is, weak students are less concentrated in the low-track, degree
of complementarity declines relative to substitutability, while the latter fails to dominate the
former in our simulation.
That our simulation shows better overall outcomes under ability mixing than under ability
grouping (tracking) does not indicate the universal superiority of ability mixing. As previously
emphasized, overall performance of ability mixing and grouping is dependent on relative strength
of complementarity and substitutability, and the design and student composition of mixed and
grouped classrooms. Difficulties exist in choosing a priori one over another in educating students,
unless substantially detailed information becomes available. Moreover, the current comparison
between mixing and grouping systems is made in terms of the difference in mean outcome,
which is obtained by giving an equal weight to every student. An evaluation becomes even
more difficult if we allow the weight to vary by student ability in order to reflect a society’s view
on the role of able and less able students.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Unweighted Weighted
Individual Characteristics Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Mathematics Test Score 600.1 (106.7) 601.2 (106.5)
Standardized Score 0.07 (0.99) 0.08 (0.99)
Age 13.61 (0.60) 13.61 (0.60)
Male 0.56 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50)
Both Parents Present 0.87 (0.33) 0.87 (0.33)
Mother’s Education
0-6 Years 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.29)
7-9 Years 0.23 (0.42) 0.22 (0.42)
10-12 Years 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)
13-14 Years 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
15+ Years 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34)
Not Reported 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28)
Father’s Education
0-6 Years 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23)
7-9 Years 0.15 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35)
10-12 Years 0.38 (0.48) 0.38 (0.48)
13-14 Years 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29)
15+ Years 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Number of Books at Home
0-10 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26)
11-25 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28)
26-100 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47)
101-200 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
201+ 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.44)
Computer at Home 0.40 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
Grade 8 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Teacher Characteristics
Male 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50)
Post-graduate Degree 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30)
Years of Experience 12.41 (9.36) 12.32 (9.39)
Hours of Teaching Activities 8.34 (4.37) 8.37 (4.34)
Frequent Teacher Meeting 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Gender-matching 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
Class/School Characteristics
Class Size 19.45 (0.85) 55.81 (6.53)
Boys-Only Class 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48)
Girls-Only Class 0.34 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47)
Coed Class 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45)
City Center Location 0.64 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48)
Peer Group Characteristics
Mean Math Score 0.07 (0.31) 0.08 (0.30)
SD of Math Score 0.95 (0.16) 0.93 (0.16)
Mean Science Score 0.04 (0.29) 0.05 (0.28)
SD of Science Score 0.97 (0.17) 0.95 (0.16)
Proportion below 25th pt 0.25 (0.12) 0.25 (0.12)
Proportion above 75th pt 0.25 (0.12) 0.25 (0.12)
Proportion of Male 0.56 (0.46) 0.56 (0.46)
Father’s Education 12.38 (1.28) 12.43 (1.26)
Mother’s Education 11.29 (1.26) 11.33 (1.26)
Books over 200 0.50 (0.16) 0.51 (0.16)
Computer at Home 0.40 (0.16) 0.41 (0.15)
Number of Students 4,813 13,598
Number of Schools 124 124
Number of Classes 248 248
Note: The weight variable is Wihtin-Class Student Weight, which
is equal to the integer part of (WGTFAC3*WGTADJ3+0.5).
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Table 2: Evidence of Randomization: Regression of Peer Variables on Student and Teacher
Characteristics
Dependent Variables
Mean of SD of Proportion Proportion
Math Score Math Score Below 25th pt Above 75th pt
Individual Characteristics
Age -0.002 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003)
Male 0.023 (0.034) 0.014 (0.023) -0.014 (0.013) -0.004 (0.015)
Both Parents Present 0.015 (0.006)* 0.000 (0.005) -0.005 (0.003)* 0.003 (0.003)
Mother’s Education
7-9 Years -0.004 (0.008) -0.006 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.003)
10-12 Years 0.005 (0.009) -0.007 (0.007) -0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004)
13-14 Years 0.011 (0.014) 0.003 (0.012) -0.002 (0.006) 0.010 (0.008)
15+ Years -0.001 (0.013) -0.012 (0.009) -0.008 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005)
Not Reported 0.002 (0.011) 0.002 (0.008) -0.002 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004)
Father’s Education
7-9 Years 0.000 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)
10-12 Years -0.009 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006) 0.007 (0.004)* -0.001 (0.003)
13-14 Years 0.000 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
15+ Years -0.014 (0.010) 0.006 (0.006) 0.013 (0.004)** -0.004 (0.005)
Number of Books
11-25 -0.007 (0.016) 0.001 (0.007) 0.000 (0.007) -0.006 (0.005)
26-100 -0.010 (0.012) -0.003 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.004)
101-200 0.001 (0.012) 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
201+ 0.004 (0.012) -0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005)
Computer at Home -0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Grade 8 0.005 (0.029) -0.001 (0.021) -0.021 (0.012) -0.009 (0.013)
Teacher Characteristics
Male -0.031 (0.052) 0.011 (0.028) 0.002 (0.022) -0.017 (0.023)
Post-graduate Degree 0.012 (0.069) -0.015 (0.048) -0.010 (0.027) 0.021 (0.032)
Years of Experience -0.004 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)* -0.002 (0.001)
Hours of Teaching Activities -0.006 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002)
Frequent Teacher Meeting -0.001 (0.044) -0.054 (0.031) -0.022 (0.020) -0.010 (0.021)
Gender-matching 0.042 (0.042) 0.010 (0.022) -0.014 (0.018) -0.001 (0.018)
Intercept 0.544 (0.245)* 1.304 (0.204)** 0.261 (0.114)* 0.455 (0.103)**
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Students 13,305 13,305 13,305 13,305
R-Square 0.753 0.487 0.686 0.690
F-test: joint sig of student 0.085 0.278 0.026 0.034
and teacher variables (p-value)
Note: The regressions are weighted by Within-Class Student Weight, which is equal to the interger part
of (WGTFAC3*WGTADJ3+0.5). Robust and cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
* and ** indicate the estimate is significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Proportion of Within-Class/Within-School Variance of Mathematics Score and Preva-
lence of Grouping by Country
Variance Decomposition
Within- Within-
Classroom School Same Course
Country Variance Variance of Math
South Korea 0.954 0.954 1.000
Japan 0.888 0.888 1.000
Thailand 0.664 0.699 0.774
Singapore 0.559 0.658 0.205
Hong Kong 0.535 0.573 1.000
Denmark 0.898 0.915 0.971
U.K 0.750 0.753 0.371
Switzerland 0.593 0.606 0.673
Netherlands 0.538 0.592 0.395
Germany 0.531 0.520 0.795
U.S.A 0.525 0.690 0.143
Source: Third International Mathematics and Science
Study, 1995
Note: Total Student Weight (TOTWGT) and non-rural
sample are used for calculation.
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